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          ABSTRACT
Prior to the adoption of the FSA (Financial Services Authority) model, supervision of UK banks was  
carried out  by  the  Bank of  England.  Although the  Bank of  England's  informal involvement  in  bank  
supervision dates back to the mid nineteenth century, it was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers  
to grant or refuse authorization to carry out banking business in the UK. Events such as the Secondary  
Banking  Crisis  of  1973-74  and  the  Banking  Coordination  Directive  of  1977  resulted  in  legislative 
changes in the form of the Banking Act 1979. Bank failures through the following years then resulted in  
changes to the legislative framework. This article looks into the claim that the FSA model has improved  
in terms of accountability in comparison to its predecessor, the Bank of England. It considers the impact  
the  FSA has made on the  financial  services  sector  and on certain legislation since its  introduction.  
Through a comparison with the Bank of England, previous and present legislation, reports and other  
sources, an assessment is made as to whether the FSA provides more accountability. Evidence provided  
here supports the conclusion that the FSA is both equipped with better accountability mechanisms and 
executes its functions in a more accountable way than its predecessor. 
INTRODUCTION
This article investigates whether improvements have been made by the Bank of England's successor, the 
Financial Services Authority – hereinafter referred to as the FSA. Part of the problems encountered by the 
Bank of England's regime was related to the Financial Services Act 1986. Through an analysis of the 
legislation operating during the Bank of England and FSA's regimes, an assessment will be made as to 
whether  accountability  has  been  improved  within  the  financial  services  sector.  An  analysis  of  both 
regulators' approaches to supervision and their regulatory framework is made to ascertain whether these 
elements have aided accountability. Segregation of duties and clear delineation of responsibilities and 
duties are found to be crucial to aiding accountability. Regulatory and supervisory responsibilities were 
formally passed to the FSA in June 1998 under the Bank of England Act 1998.ii  
Until the early 1970s, the Bank of England's ability to gather information was limited to the collection of 
monetary statistics and the informal monitoring of banking institutions.iii The intensity of  monitoring 
depended on the type of relationship an institution had with the Bank of England; more attention was 
given to discount houses and accepting houses.iv During the Secondary Banking Crisis in 1973, UK bank 
supervision was managed by a group which consisted of 15 people. A personal approach to supervision 
was  in  existence  at  that  time.  However,  following  the  Secondary  Banking  Crisis,  a  new  Banking 
Supervision Division was established with the number of staff rising to 70 over three years. Thus the 
“personal approach” stance to supervision was reduced.
The Banking Act 1979 section 16 gave to the Bank of England “The Bank” power to compel “licensed 
deposit-takers”, the lower tier of institutions authorized under the statute, to disclose any information that 
might be requested of them or to produce reports on such information by an accountant authorized by the 
Bank. The Bank was also given powers to appoint investigators who were to examine the affairs of an 
authorized institution. There was no attempt to depart from established cooperative supervisory practices 
of the Bank and the Bank's flexible, personal, progressive (tiered) and participative “supervisory style” 
was maintained despite  the  fact  that  under  new licensing  requirements,  large  numbers  of  previously 
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unregulated institutions had been brought for the first time under the Bank's responsibility.v Following the 
collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers in 1984, the Leigh Pemberton Committee was set up to review 
banking  supervisory  arrangements.  The  “tiered”  approach  was  abandoned  and  the  Bank's  power  to 
request information was extended to cover all banks in a move aimed at improving supervision.vi There 
was also increased emphasis on the requirement by authorized institutions to maintain sufficient internal 
controls and the establishment of audit committees consisting of non-executive directors. A system of 
occasional  on-site  examinations was introduced where  small  review teams of supervisors along with 
accountants or bankers on temporary assignment  from their firms to the Bank, visited usually for a period 
of a few days the authorized institutions for the purpose of assessing the quality of their lending and 
control systems or examining particular areas of concern.vii
Following  the  collapse  of  Johnson  Matthey  Bankers,  the  resulting  legislation  paved  way  for  the 
establishment of a Board of Banking Supervision in May 1986 to assist the Governor of the Bank of 
England. The Board consisted of nine members, three of which were ex officio members, the Governor, 
Deputy Governor and Head of Supervision. Six outsiders provided expertise in the areas of banking, 
accountancy and law. The effectiveness of the Board of Banking Supervision was questioned after the 
Bingham Reportviii observed that the Board lacked vital information to perform its duties. Following this 
incident, the level and detail of information received by the Board was increased. The Board met more 
frequently and was more involved in every aspect of the Bank's regulatory work. 
The Banking Act 1987 vested in the Bank wide powers relating to the collection of information and the 
monitoring of authorized institutions. Schedule 3 of the Act covers the minimum criteria for authorization 
of an institution as a bank and provided foundation for the Bank of England's supervisory position. Apart 
from vesting  in  the  Bank  wide  powers  relating  to  the  collection  of  information  and  monitoring  of 
authorized institutions,  the Banking Act  of  1987 introduced the involvement of  bank auditors in  the 
supervisory process.  The collapse  of  BCCI also led to  the  adoption of  a  more intrusive supervisory 
attitude.ix The number of on-site bank examinations increased to about 120 to 130 visits per year in 1995.x 
However,  supervision  remained  largely  dependent  on  information  received  from  the  authorized 
institutions themselves and the introduction of bank examinations on a quasi-permanent basis, as is the 
case in the US supervisory system was strongly resisted. The BCCI crisis also brought further change 
within  the  organizational  structure  of  the  Bank  led  to  two  new divisions  within  the  Bank:  that  for 
Monetary Stability and that for Financial Stability. The decision-making process within the Bank was 
hierarchical  -  with  the  junior  supervisors  being  entrusted  with  day-to-day  monitoring  of  authorized 
institutions and not being authorized to take corrective action where it appeared to them appropriate.xi A 
critical decision was taken only after full consideration of circumstances of the case and at a higher level 
by  senior  regulators  –  subject  to  the  Governor's  approval.  The  collapse  of  Barings  Bank  in  1995 
highlighted the fact that no on-site visits had ever been undertaken and that two had been planned for that 
year. The style of supervision by the Bank was one still based on trust in the “blue blooded banks” that 
did not require supervision.xii
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: In the following section, regulation under 
the Bank of England regime is examined. This is followed by a section examining regulation under the 
Financial Services Authority regime. Next, a comparison of regulation under the two regimes is provided. 
Finally, the paper ends with some concluding comments and a discussion of the limitations of the paper.
REGULATION UNDER THE BANK OF ENGLAND
Polizatto distinguishes regulatory systems into two: moral suasion versus legalism and hands-off versus 
hands-on approaches.xiii Britain’s system is more in line with the persuasive hands-off approach – even 
though  as  argued  by  Vieten,xiv British  banking  regulation  is  also  governed  by  law.  The  system of 
supervision adopted by the Bank of England was one based on an informal regulatory approach which 
was based  on  influence  and  trust.  A  shared  sense  of  hostility  towards  government  bureaucracy  and 
statutory rules in the City resulted in banks submitting to the Bank of England's and the trade associations' 
persuasive powers.xv The Bank also maintained regular contacts with the main banking associations. As a 
result of the nature of the relationship between the Bank of England and the government – the Bank of 
England being a representative of City interests, the Bank of England had an informal relationship with 
the banks. This informal relationship would no doubt have provided the perfect situation whereby the 
Bank could have been “captured” by the industry it was supposed to have regulated.  
According  to  Roberts,xvi the  internationalization  of  London  and  the  growth  of  non-bank  financial 
institutions in the 1960s started eroding the Bank's powers of moral suasion. Moran also states that the 
Bank's  approach during the Secondary Banking Crisis was driven by fear  of bureaucracy and placed 
excessive trust in regulatees at a period when internationalization and innovation proved unworkable for a 
regulatory system based on trust.xvii In order to find a balance between the perceived benefits  of the 
traditional system and the demands of an innovative market, the Bank introduced a two-tier system of 
recognition where the traditional system was reserved for the first tier and more intervention envisaged 
for tier two.xviii This approach was deemed flexible as preservation of the Bank's informal approach suited 
and adapted well to the changing market.xix However, with the enactment of the 1979 and 1987 banking 
acts, a trend towards growing formalization and reduction in the personal character of supervision was 
observed.xx
The collapse of banks such as Johnson Matthey Bankers (later rescued), BCCI and Barings, not only led 
to calls for change in  the way  in which  prudential  supervision  was  carried  out but also to changes in 
the legislative framework. The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers caused immense damage on the 
reputation of the Bank of England and exposed its supervisory practices as complacent – injuring its 
relationship with major British banks.xxi These banks were annoyed at having to bear the costs of the 
rescue.xxii Apart  from the abolition of the two tier  system which had been in  operation at  that  time, 
weaknesses in the supervision of large exposures and the adequacy of control systems were identified. A 
recommendation was made for the introduction of statutory arrangements for the exchange of information 
between auditors  and  regulators.  Calls  were  made  for  the  introduction  of  a  new Board  of  Banking 
Supervision – which was supposed to put the Bank under increased accountability. Other measures by 
Parliament included the strengthening of the Bank's  powers to require information and to commence 
investigations into the affairs of authorized institutions. The release of bank auditors from their duty of 
confidentiality  to  client  institutions  to  the  extent  necessary  for  facilitating  the  communication  of 
information of regulatory evidence to the Bank, was also facilitated.
The  most  credible  reason  for  keeping  regulatory  action  secret  was  that  confidence  in  a  particular 
institution  could  be  damaged if  restrictive  measures  against  it  became known –  which  may lead  to 
unreasonable termination.xxiii Under the Banking Act 1987 section 17, the only piece of information that 
the Bank made available about banking institutions was whether they were authorized by the Banking 
Act. As well as hindering accountability, regulatory secrecy also undermines market transparency. If it 
were “reasonably certain” that a financial institution was beyond the stage where it could be rescued, then 
public  should be  aware  of  the  impending risks  associated with such institutions.  Such an institution 
should be disallowed from trading when it is obvious that it would only be wasting investors'  funds. 
Detecting when to go public about such institutions' affairs and whether such affairs could be discovered 
on time is crucial. The collapse of BCCI resulted to the Bank of England being more willing to provide 
information about circumstances leading to the collapse and reduced to some extent the emphasis on 
confidentiality.xxiv However despite the willingness of the Bank to publicize and explain its regulatory 
practices  through  speeches  of  its  governors  and  directors,  articles  in  the  Quarterly  Bulletin  and 
appearances before parliamentary committees, the regulatory system then remained opaque to a large 
extent.xxv Existence of a statutory duty of regulatory confidentiality presented an impediment towards 
achieving greater accountability and transparency.
Following the Johnson Matthey affair, relations between the Bank and Treasury were damaged as the 
Chancellor had provided misleading information to Parliament in failing to mention a direct loan made to 
Johnson Matthey which went beyond the indemnity under discussion and of which the Chancellor himself 
was unaware.xxvi After this incident, a solution was arrived at in which the Bank was always to consult the 
Treasury prior to committing financial resources to a rescue operation.xxvii There also followed a more 
consistent approach to keeping the Treasury informed of impending problems – especially in situations 
where the failure or closure of an institution could have systemic implications or where a regulatory 
decision  was  likely  to  attract  parliamentary  questions.xxviii Even  though  these  arrangements  did  not 
improve the situation relating to accountability for the Bank's regulatory decisions (in particular since 
Treasury still declined responsibility to Parliament), the new arrangements improved the preparedness of 
the Treasury to face inconvenient questions.xxix
The duty of making reports improved transparency so far as the general policies underlying its regulatory 
decisions were explained in its  pages – however, it  had serious limitations as a means of  increasing 
accountability to Parliament.xxx The figures published in the annual reports, as well as showing that the 
Bank actually refused authorization only to a small proportion of applicants, also showed that the powers 
of revocation and restriction were rarely used.xxxi  Investigations by Select Committees, and in particular 
the  Treasury  and  Civil  Service  provided  the  only  direct  and  possibly  only  effective  means  for 
parliamentary  scrutiny  of  the  Bank's  regulatory  activities.xxxii Following  the  collapse  of  BCCI,  the 
Treasury Committee was critical of the way the Bank had handled the matter and recommended a stricter 
supervisory approach.xxxiii
Shortcomings of  the  Bank of  England which were  also highlighted  during  the  collapse  of  BCCIxxxiv 
included the fact that the Bank had authorized BCCI as a licensed deposit-taker under the 1979 Act even 
though it did not know or understand the shareholding structure of the institution's group and as a result, 
could not confirm whether its controllers were fit and proper persons.xxxv In addition, the Bank had not 
tried to stop BCCI from using a banking name even though it was aware that as a UK based second-tier 
institution, the institution was not entitled to do so. It was also highlighted that the Bank had not acted at 
all even though it had been aware of Luxembourg's inability to exercise effective supervision. BCCI's 
auditor  Price  Waterhouse  was  also  blamed  for  failing  to  communicate  fully  to  the  Bank  about  the 
situation.  After  pressure  from the US authorities,  the  Bank commissioned a  report  which led to  the 
closure of BCCI. The recommendations in the report included:xxxvi The imposition on bank auditors of a 
statutory duty to report to the Bank all information they know or should reasonably know to be relevant to 
the  exercise  of  its  supervisory  responsibilities  under  the  Banking  Act;xxxvii the  strengthening  of 
communication  systems  within  the  Bank,  to  ensure  that  all  critical  information  reached  its  senior 
officials;xxxviii an increase in the Bank's responsiveness to allegations of wrongdoing and the more active 
investigation of suspect banksxxxix and a closer involvement of the Board of Banking Supervision in the 
supervisory process.xl However, even though it was acknowledged that there had been deficiencies in the 
BCCI case, none of the Bank's staff was held to account.
Following the collapse of Barings, neither the Board of Banking Supervision Report nor the Andersen 
Review  of  Supervision  considered  a  total overhaul  in  the  Bank's  approach  to  supervision.  The 
predominantly “off-site” nature of the supervision undertaken by the Bank was lauded by the Andersen 
Review as being flexible and able to influence banks by persuasion and not just the force of law or 
detailed rules.xli The Treasury Committee however noted that it was partly due to the discretionary basis 
of the Bank's approach to supervision that there was limitation in its ability to detect events at Barings and 
that some of the measures proposed in the Bank's review would help reduce the scope for flexibility.xlii 
According to the Bank's Review of Supervision,xliii the Arthur Andersen Review (supported by the Bank's 
Review of Supervision), suggests that the use of formal risk assessment models will mean there is need 
“to bring the line supervisors into direct contact, on site, with a wider range of management”.
Even  though  the  Bank committed  itself  to  addressing  the  problems posed  by  evaluation  of  internal 
controls at banks and to addressing internal communication at the Bank itself by dedicating an increase in 
the resources towards supervision,  it  maintained a defense of  retaining a non-rules based judgmental 
approach to supervision.xliv   The  Board  of  Banking Supervision Report  identified  a  number of  lessons 
arising  from  the  collapse of Barings  and  a  series  of  17  recommendations  for  the  Bank. xlv Of  the 
original  17  recommendations,  15  were  reviewed  in  detail  with  the  Board.xlvi
List of Recommendations for the Bank of England
i) Go  further  in  its  role  as  consolidation  supervisor.xlvii
ii) Seek  to  obtain  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  non-banking  businesses  in  a  group  and  of  how  the  risks  in 
such  businesses  are  controlled,  as  part  of  the  task  of  understanding  where  the  “significant”  risks  in  the  group  lie.  The 
Bank  should  meet  the  management  of  these  parts  of  the  group  on  a  formal  basis  and  the  questioning  should  range 
widely.
iii) Prepare  internal  guidelines  to  assist  its  staff  in  identifying  “material  risks”  in  a  banking  group  and  in  protecting  depositors.xlviii
iv) Ensure  that  it  understands  key  elements  of  the  management  and  control  structures  of  those banking  groups  where  it  is  responsible  for 
consolidated  supervision.xlix    It should  receive prior notice  of significant  re-organization and of significant  new  operations  being  undertaken 
by  such  groups  together  with  relevant  reporting  responsibilities.
v) The  scope  of  returns  currently  submitted  to  the  Bank  should  be  reviewed.
vi) A  senior  director  should  take  responsibility  within  each  bank  for  the  accuracy  of  returns  and  should  sign  the  most  important 
prudential  returns.  He  or  she  should  meet  the  Bank  at  least  once  a  year.
vii) Solo  consolidation of any active trading entity within a bank should be formally approved by the Executive Director  in charge of supervision 
and surveillance or one of Bank’s  Governors.
viii) Internal  guidelines  should  be  prepared  for  Bank  staff  as  to  the  procedures  to  be followed  with  respect  to  the  granting  and  review  of 
solo  consolidation.
ix) Review  its  Memorandums  of  Understanding (MOUs) with  the  Securities and Futures Authority  and  with  other  UK  regulators.
x) Extend  its  international  co-ordination  where  possible  signing  MOUs  and  involving  non  banking  regulators.
xi) Extend  its  initiative  of  meeting  the  internal  audit  departments  of  banks  and  where  the  Bank  is  consolidated  supervisor,  should  extend 
this  to  include  the  group  internal  audit  function.  The  Bank  should  also  meet  the  chairman  of  the  audit  committee  in  case  of  large  UK 
incorporated  institutions.
xii) Review  the  number  and  skills  of  the  staff  it  considers  it  needs  for  on-site  visits  and  consultation  on  a  range  of  capital  market  and 
other  issues.
xiii) The  scope  of  section  39  reports  should  be  extended  to  go  outside  banks  and  outside  the  UK  as  necessary  and  could  be  used  more 
flexibly.l
xiv) Periodically  require  authorized  institutions  to  widen  reports  commissioned  into  systems  and  controls  to  cover  the  preparation  and 
inputting  of  data  in  major  overseas  locations.
xv) Extend  its  guidance  to  managers  in  relation  to  large  exposures,  requiring  that  existing  concessions  are  formally  reported  to  the 
relevant  Head of Division  on  an  annual  basis  and  that  breaches  be  reported  upwards  regularly.
xvi) Complete examination of the extent of issuance of comfort letters and guarantees.
xvii) Introduce  an  independent  quality  assurance  review  of  its  supervision  of  banks  and  regular  reports  should  be  made  to  the  Board  of 
Banking  Supervision.
Would it have been difficult to change the culture which had existed between the Bank of England and 
the City for many decades? This would have required radical reform which may have proved difficult to 
implement at once. “Rome was not built in one day” and cultural change is always a great challenge. It 
was clearly vital to transfer banking supervision to an institution which did not have a cozy relationship 
with the City. The proximity of the Bank with the City was a key factor in the weakening of its regulatory 
capabilities. 
The  Bank  of  England's  1996  Annual  Report  identified  three  core  purposes  of  the  Bank  namely: 
maintaining the integrity and value of the currency, maintaining the stability of the financial system, both 
domestically and internationally and seeking to ensure the effectiveness of the UK's financial services.li 
The Annual Report also goes on to explain that “in exceptional circumstances, the Bank may also provide 
or organize last resort financial support where this is needed to avoid systemic damage.” Since banks are 
expected to take risks, it would be expected that the Bank would not aim at eliminating all elements of 
risk within the financial system. From the report on the Barings collapse,lii it was highlighted that the 
Bank could not fulfill its main objective of protecting the financial system without some assessment of 
the internal workings of the firms in the market – which included the quality of their management. It was 
also highlighted that guarding against systemic risk was vital to maintaining the integrity of the financial 
system. Another vital important evidence – the fact that lack of internal controls could lead to the demise 
of an institution was emphasized. 
REGULATION UNDER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY
The FSA is the renamed Securities and Investments Board (SIB) which was set up under the Financial  
Services  Act  1986.   The FSA's  regulatory objectives include  maintaining confidence in  the  financial 
system,  promoting  public  understanding  of  the  financial  system,  securing  the  appropriate  degree  of 
protection for consumers and reducing financial crime.liii Just a comparison of the aims and objectives of 
the FSA and the Bank of England highlight where their work and concentration is focussed. The focus on 
public  awareness  and  consumers  by  the  FSA is  a  testament  to  its  commitment  towards  public 
accountability. The FSA's regulatory principles include: The need to use its resources in the most efficient 
and economic way,liv the  responsibilities  of  those who manage the  affairs  of  authorized persons;  the 
principle that a burden or restriction which is placed on a person, or on the carrying on of a regulated 
activity, should be proportionate to the benefit intended to be conferred in general by that provision; lv the 
desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with regulated activities; the international character of 
financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United 
Kingdom and  the  principle  that  competition  between  authorized  persons  should  not  be  impeded  or 
distorted unnecessarily.lvi
The  statement  of  these  objectives  and  principles  provides  for  a  clearer  regulatory  framework  in 
comparison to those objectives of the previous regulator, the Bank of England - which was largely opaque 
as regards its aims. These objectives will be key to holding the FSA accountable as to how it operates. 
There have been debates relating to the order of priority of the objectives and whether some principles 
should  be  given  as  much  priority  as  objectives.  The  consumer  objective  whilst  ensuring  that  some 
accountability is afforded by the FSA towards consumers, has been considered by some to impose too 
much a burden on consumerslvii. In addition, Goodhart lviii suggests that a single regulator may lack clear 
focus on the objectives and rationale of regulation.
According to Vietenlix, banking regulation has followed two trends namely: that supervision has become 
increasingly formalized and reliant on quantitative tools and that regulatory duties are pushed down a 
regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist the resources of regulatees. According to the 
Core Principleslx for effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective banking supervisory system should 
consist of a mix of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision. The UK system involves both on-site and 
off-site supervision.lxi
Off-site supervision involves the regulator making use of external auditors. Off - site supervision by the 
FSA (Use of External Auditors by the FSA), is based on the Supervision Manual (SUP).  The SUP forms 
part of the regulatory processes section of the FSA Handbook and SUP 3 of this manual which deals with 
auditors, states that:lxii The FSA must ensure that auditors have the skill, resources and experience to 
enable them deal with the scale, nature and complexity of the bank and regulatory requirements to which 
it is subject; A bank must notify the FSA as soon as it has been informed that its audit is likely to be 
qualified; If the auditor writes to the bank about its internal controls, the bank must inform the FSA 
promptly of material issues; Auditors of banks must co-operate with the FSA by attending meetings and 
supplying information; The FSA may pass auditor's information relevant to their function as they are 
bound by the confidentiality provisions of FSMA 2000; Auditors ceasing to audit a bank must notify the 
FSA, without delay, of any matter connected with their departure which the FSA should know or if there 
is nothing they need to know about. 
On-site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned 
by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors.lxiii At present, the external auditor assists the 
FSA through a  mixed  system of  supervision  whereby the  FSA inspects  banks  (on-site)  and  utilizes 
external auditors (off-site). The FSA expects banks to provide information voluntarily to deal with it in an 
open and co-operative way and tell it promptly about anything significant.lxiv If necessary however, the 
FSA can use its  powers  to obtain information,  require  the preparation of reports  by skilled persons, 
appoint investigators and apply for a warrant to enter premises.lxv The FSA can also visit banks – with or 
without  notification and a bank's  employees,  agents or  representatives may be asked to go to  FSA's 
offices and must be available for meetings.lxvi Privileged communications need not be disclosed – unless 
the holder or subject is supervised or the subject gives consent.lxvii
Barings as well as highlighting the problems and gaps which existed with prudential banking supervision, 
poor regulation and supervision of multi function firms,lxviii also highlighted the misleading problem of 
relying on the capital adequacy ratio as the sole source of determining a financial institution's well-being. 
Regulators  impose  liquidity  monitoring  measures  on  banks  to  meet  specified  minimum  levels  of 
withdrawals but such measures are precautionary against short-term cash flow problems rather than a 
situation of panic outburst.lxix The level of confidence reposed in the public by the financial community is 
what sustains banks in modern times and this is strengthened by external checks which  is given by credit 
agencies through scrutiny of published accounts and by bank regulation through prudential supervision.lxx 
Prudential  regulation however,  is  not  the  only way in  which the  FSA takes  interest  in  the  financial 
management of authorized firms – there is also the principle of ensuring that a firm operates with required 
minimum level of capital in order to reduce the consequences of failure.lxxi
Statutory requirements govern the minimum amount of capital which a bank must have. lxxii These have 
been established by UK and European legislation and from internationally agreed recommendations of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.lxxiii The FSA’s approach  to the calculation of  the capital base 
and  the  capital  ratios and  the  assessment  of  capital  adequacy  are  set  out  in chapters of  the  FSA’s 
Interim Prudential Sourcebook for Banks (IPRU (BANK)).lxxiv This has been supplemented by FSA policy 
statement Individual  Capital  Ratios  for  Banks.  In due course this  will  be replaced by the Integrated 
Prudential Source book.lxxv In addition, at  the international  level, the Basel Committee has issued far-
reaching  proposals  to  refine and  develop the current approach. 
A COMPARISON OF REGIMES
At the time of the enactment of the Banking Act 1979, it was expected that parliamentary control over 
and accountability for the Bank's general direction of regulatory activities would be achieved at various 
levels.lxxvi However, the handling of individual cases was realized to be a quasi-judicial matter in which 
responsibility was assigned to the Bank only – thereby excluding the Treasury.lxxvii The form of indirect 
political accountability whereby the Bank was accountable to Parliament through the Treasury had proved 
unworkable as Treasury ministers were powerless to intervene in the supervisory process.lxxviii 
Many questions have been raised in relation to the FSA's ability to be held accountable – given the all 
embracing nature of its role and concentration of powers. Such questions includelxxix whether the FSA 
could be made sufficiently accountable to industry whilst avoiding regulatory capture, whether it could be 
made properly accountable to consumers without creating false perceptions and possible moral hazard 
concerns about the extent to which the regulatory system would protect them from financial risks and the 
mechanisms  in  place  to  hold  it  politically  accountable  since  it  is  independent  of  government.  Fears 
particularly relate to the discretion given to the FSA as to how best to meets its objectiveslxxx – even 
though many commentatorslxxxi have suggested that the regulatory objectives and principles provide a 
basis for legal accountability. As a result of consolidation of the responsibilities for financial regulation 
into a single regulator, there are less possibilities for gaps in accountability since there is clearer evidence 
as to who is responsible for what.
The  FSA Chairman  suggested  that  the  “prime  accountability  route”  for  the  FSA would  be  through 
Ministers to Parliament but some commentators have doubted the effectiveness of political accountability 
in relation to the FSA. Even though there is government control in that HM Treasury appoints the FSA 
Board, can order independent reviews of its financial affairs and commission independent inquiries into 
regulatory  failures,  the  Treasury  cannot  intervene  directly  in  the  FSA's  affairs  apart  from  limited 
situations concerned with competition.lxxxii
As regards  public  accountability,  the  FSA is  obliged to  maintain arrangements  for  consultation with 
consumers and practitioners.lxxxiii There are also concerns that the independence of the Practitioner and 
Consumer  Panels  would  be  compromised  since  they  have  been  established  by  the  FSA.  However 
statutory roles were given to both the Practitioner and Consumer Panels and on the 18th June 2001, the 
commencement  order  giving  these  roles  came  into  force.  Section  11  of  the  Financial  Services  and 
Markets Act 2000 brought an important part of the formal accountability of the FSA to the Panel into 
effect and provides that if the FSA should ever reject formal advice offered by the Panel, it should have to 
explain its reasons in writing.lxxxiv In addition, the Practitioner Panel has a measure of independence from 
the FSA as its chairman cannot be appointed or dismissed without the approval of the Treasury.lxxxv  A 
brief account of the mechanisms whereby the FSA is held accountable is summarized as in Table 2.lxxxvi
Table 2:  ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS OF THE FSA
 The Treasury: The chairman and the Board of the FSA are to be appointed and replaced by the Treasury. The Treasury also has the role of  
approving other appointments in relation to the FSA, such as the independent investigator. The FSA is required to submit an annual report to the 
Treasury which must also be laid before Parliament. The Treasury will be able to commission independent reports on the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness with which the FSA has used its resources. The FSA must also give the Treasury copies of any rules and guidance it makes. Where 
competition concerns exist about the FSA or its rules, the Treasury can instruct the FSA to remedy the problem.
Parliament:  Since the FSA's annual report is to be laid before Parliament by the Treasury, the report will be available for Parliamentary scrutiny.
FSA Board: The FSA will be accountable to its Board. The Board is required to have a majority of non-executive directors. A non-executive 
committee of the board is charged with keeping under review the efficiency of the FSA's discharge of its responsibilities.
Independent Complaints Investigator: Such an investigator is responsible for investigating complaints about exercise of the FSA's functions. 
Investigator's appointment and dismissal requires Treasury approval.
The Public: The FSA will hold public meetings on the annual report where there must be reasonable opportunity for questions to be put before 
the FSA.
Consumer and Practitioner Panels: The FSA is required to consult both panels about how far its general policies and practices conform to its 
statutory duties. This statutory obligation also includes its regulatory objectives and principles.
Consultation: The FSA is obliged to conduct public consultation on rules which it proposes to make. This provision aims to ensure that rule-
making powers are used in a way that is focused and transparent.
Statutory Immunity:  The FSA and its staff are given statutory immunity from liability in damages for things done during discharge of their  
functions. This immunity extends to staff of the compensation scheme and does not apply to actions done in bad faith nor to damages arising  
under the Human Rights Act 1998.
LEGISLATION, ENFORCEMENT DURING AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986
The extent to which the FSA could be judged to be a better model of accountability will very much 
depend on its  approach to rule-making and enforcement.lxxxvii The original  rulebooks of  the five self-
regulating organizations (SROs) which existed under the Financial Services Act 1986 were perceived as 
being unduly legalistic and lacking in coherence.lxxxviii The “new settlement” introduced by the Companies 
Act 1989 helped to resolve these problems by introducing new provisions into the FSA 1986 Act which 
would help simplify individual rulebooks of the SROs and provide some consistency between them.lxxxix 
The result of the “new settlement” was that the rulebooks of the SIB and the SROs were divided into 
three  tiers  namely:  10  general  principles;  40  core  rules  which  were  a  mandatory  part  of  the  SRO 
rulebooks and third tier  rules made by the SROs.xc However, this three-tier structure changed on the 
advent of a new SIB Chairman in 1992. A move away from emphasis on rules and the structure of rules to 
compliance with the spirit of the rules and an emphasis on management responsibility for compliance was 
realized.xci
A number of problems related to enforcement arose from the FSA 1986. These included the relative 
inexperience of regulators in operating the system combined with the on-going process of development of 
the rules.xcii Apart from the fact that the SIB/FSA had no power to fine under the FSA 1986, there was 
also the problem of identifying separate roles of the SIB/FSA and the SROs in enforcement.xciii Although a 
number of  changes were made by the introduction of the Financial Services and Markets Bill,  some 
provisions were carried over from the FSA 1986 to the FSMB.xciv  Under clause 98 of the FSMB, the FSA 
was given a general power to fine authorized persons and specific powers to impose civil fines related to 
market abuse. The FSA's powers of  “monitoring and enforcement” are contained within section 6 of 
Schedule  1  Part  1  -  section  6(1)  of  the  FSMA  which  states  that  'The  Authority  must  maintain 
arrangements designed to enable it determine whether persons on whom requirements are imposed by or 
under this Act are complying with them.' Part III of Schedule 1 deals with penalties and fees. 
The FSA Handbook describes the FSA's risk based approach to supervision. The FSA operates on a risk-
based approach whereby it differentiates between regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of 
greater perceived risk.xcv It identifies three sources of risk namely:xcvi The external environment; consumer 
and industry-wide risks and the regulated institutions themselves. Furthermore, the FSMA 2000 requires 
the FSA to pursue its objectives by re-enforcing the responsibilities of senior management.xcvii   Risk, in 
particular risk to its four statutory objectives, is now used as the determinant for all regulatory activity, 
including overall strategy and development.xcviii It has the following stages:xcix Identifying the risks to the 
statutory objectives; Assessing and then prioritizing the risks; Considering the probability of a problem 
occurring by considering factors such as business risk, external context and the firm's business strategy 
and decisions;  Prioritizing its  regulatory position by “multiplying” the  impact  of  the  problem (  if  it 
occurs)  by the probability of  the problem occurring.c  Having completed these assessments,  the FSA, 
taking into account the resources at its disposal, will decide on its regulatory response.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the FSA's risk based approach has led to a reduced role for auditors in banking supervision.ci 
From 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004, the FSA exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to require firms to produce a skilled person's report in 28 situations.cii This 
is a considerable reduction in investigations from the number of reporting accountants commissioned 
under section 39 Banking Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.ciii
Although there has been a reduction in the FSA's use of external auditors when compared to the regime of 
its  predecessor  the  Bank  of  England,  it  can  still  be  argued  that  the  FSA not  only  possesses  better 
accountability mechanisms than the Bank, but that so far, it has used these mechanisms reasonably well. 
This is evidenced by the FSA operating on a more rules-based regime, providing greater identification of 
its role in enforcement and having a clearer set of principles. Effective implementation is definitely more 
important than the sole possession of accountability mechanisms. Issues within the FSA which need to be 
addressed  include  funding:  The  FSA is  independent  of  and  does  not  receive  any  funding  from the 
government.  To  finance  its  work,  it  charges  fees  to  all  authorized  firms  that  carry  out  activities  it 
regulates.civ Given the way charges are imposed on regulated firms, better accountability mechanisms 
should be in place for the way the FSA's costs are incurred. It is also arguable that its principle of utilizing 
its resources in the most efficient and economic way (FSMA s 2 (3)(a)), should be elevated to the status 
of an objective. 
In response to the FSA's ability to levy unlimited fines, the government has agreed that these fines should 
be set off against the FSA's other finance to reduce any incentive to maximize penalties and that the FSA 
should not be able to add its own costs to any levied fines.cv  On the 27th May 2005, a review of its 
funding regime was announced with the realization of the need to drive down costs. The period from the 
1st April 2004 to the 31st March 2005 saw particularly the review of 2 aspects of the FSA’s performance 
and this has provided sufficient, if not absolute evidence that the FSA has performed well so far. The first 
of these aspects involved examination of costs imposed  on  the  regulated – this being done jointly with 
the Practitioner Panel.cvi The second was the examination of the effectiveness and fairness of the FSA’s 
enforcement process.
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